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ARTICLES
Brazil's Agricultural Trade War:
Success and Failure on the Southern
Route to Antarctica
Becky L. Jacobs*
I. INTRODUCTION - A LINE IN THE SAND
On September 8, 2004, the World Trade Organization
("WTO") issued a report documenting Brazil's landmark victory in
its trade battle against U.S. cotton subsidies.1 The Report con-
cluded that certain U.S. government subsidies to cotton producers
caused "serious prejudice" to Brazilian cotton farmers by encour-
aging excessive U.S. production of cotton, thus depressing world
cotton prices. 2 This decision, the first ever by the WTO on agricul-
tural subsidies, dealt the United States its most serious trade
defeat in recent history.
Exultant Brazilian officials vowed: "This is a war that must
continue[.] " The victory was particularly sweet for Brazil in light
of some rather provocative comments made by U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative Robert Zoellick in 2002.4 In October of that year, the
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1. Report of the Panel, United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WTJDS267/R
(Sept. 8, 2004) [hereinafter the "WTO Upland Cotton Panel Report"]. This Report
followed the Panel's submission of its interim report to the parties on April 2, 2004.
The Panel submitted its final report to the parties on June 18, 2004. Id.
2. Id.
3. U.S. Loses WTO Cotton Subsidy Case, BBC NEWS WORLD EDITION, Apr. 27,
2004, at httpJ/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3662183.stm.
4. The U.S. Trade Representative is a member of the U.S. Cabinet and serves as
the President's principal trade policy adviser and chief trade negotiator. Mr. Zoellick
assumed office as the U.S. Trade Representative on February 7, 2001, with the rank
of Ambassador. On February 22, 2005, Mr. Zoellick was sworn in as the Deputy
Secretary of State under Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. See Biography: Robert
B. Zoellick, U.S. Department of State, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/42449.htm
(Feb. 22, 2005). President Bush nominated U.S. Representative Rob Portman (R-
Ohio) to be the new U.S. Trade Representative. See Paul Blustein, Rep. Portman
Named Next U.S. Trade Representative, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2005, at E02, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45653-2005Mar17.html. This
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Miami Herald quoted Mr. Zoellick as warning Brazil that it could
"take the southern route to Antarctica" to sell its products if it did
not embrace the Free Trade Area of the Americas ("FTAA").'
Brazilians interpreted Representative Zoellick's threat as "an
open declaration of war. . . ," and, "[flor Brazil - increasingly a
thorn in the side of Washington's trade agenda[,]" the WTO ruling
marks a major victory in its campaign to transform the dynamics
of international trade negotiations.'
article focuses on Mr. Zoellick's tenure of office as Trade Representative, during which
he was the principal architect of the Central America Free Trade Agreement
("CAFTA") and aggressively pursued the Bush Administration's Free Trade Area of
the Americas ("FTAA") agenda. Mr. Zoellick has served both Bush Administrations.
During President George H.W. Bush's Administration, Mr. Zoellick served as Under
Secretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs, as well as Counselor to the
Department. During this time, he was the lead State Department official in the
negotiations on the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), the Uruguay
Round, and the creation and launch of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation group.
Mr. Zoellick also was instrumental in working with the Congress on the 1991 vote on
"fast-track" negotiating authority. He holds a J.D. from the Harvard Law School and
a Master of Public Policy degree from Harvard University's Kennedy School of
Government. For Representative Zoellick's official biography, see United States Trade
Representative, Ambassador Robert B. Zoellick, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/govern
mentIzoellick-bio.html (last visited April 14, 2005). Mr. Zoellick often was the focus of
critics of the Bush Administration's trade policies. Critics charged that Mr. Zoellick
zealously preached free trade, yet the United States does not practice free trade. See,
e.g., Kevin Watkins, Trade Hypocrisy: The Problem with Robert Zoellick, GLOBAL
POLICY FORUM (Dec. 20, 2002), available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/ffd/
2002/1220hypocrisy.htm (discussing U.S. agricultural subsidies). Further, Mr.
Zoellick's association with private industry left him somewhat vulnerable to claims
that he sought to enrich corporate interests at the expense of the citizenry. For
example, he served on the advisory Council of Enron Corporation and was a board
member of Alliance Capital, Said Holdings, and Jones Intercable. See United States
Trade Representative, Ambassador Robert B. Zoellick, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
governmentzoellick-bio.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2005).
5. Daniel McLaughlin, Take a Hike to Antarctica, BRAZZIL (Nov. 2002), available
at http'/www.brazzil.com/pages/pl0nov02.htm. For brevity's sake, the author
assumes that readers will have some familiarity with trade issues and terminology.
Accordingly, commonly used acronyms will receive only minimal explanatory footnote
material. For example, the FTAA (in Spanish: Area de Libre Comercio de las
Amdricas ("ALCA"); in French: Zone de libre-6change des Am~riques ("ZLEA"); in
Portuguese: Area de Livre Comdrcio das Amngricas ("ALCA")) is a proposed agreement
to eliminate or reduce trade barriers among all of the nations in the Western
Hemisphere, except Cuba. See generally Official Website of the Free Trade Area of the
Americas, at http'//www.alca-ftaa.org/alca-e.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2005).
6. William Greider & Kenneth Rapoza, Lula Raises the Stakes, THE NATION (Dec.
1, 2003), available at http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20031201&c=l&s=
greider; Jane Bussey, Boll evil? U.S. Detractors Waging Cotton Tug of War -The
WTO's Ruling that Subsidies to U.S. Cotton Farmers Artificially Skews International
Prices, Elicits Cheers from Many Places Not Named Washington, MIAMI HERALD (May
2, 2004), available at http'//www.geocities.com/ericsquire/articles/ftaa/mh040502.
htm.
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Yet Brazil's success in this trade war may exact a high toll,
producing both international and domestic casualties in its march
along the southern route to Antarctica.7 Developed nations have
cast Brazil as the villain in a series of failed multilateral trade
negotiations, direly predicting that its uncompromising stance
will undermine the interests of the poor countries whose cause it
purports to champion." A growing chorus of international skeptics
question Brazil's stimulus and standing to represent a constitu-
ency of developing nations given the size of its economy and its
ascendance as an international "agribusiness titan."9 Brazil's
trade war also may result in domestic casualties. The nation's
leaders "ha[ve] yet to explain fully to Brazil's 180 million people
how [its international trade victories and increasing] global politi-
cal influence will fix its 11% illiteracy rate, widespread poverty,
crumbling roads, and stifling bureaucracy."10
This short article" tracks Brazil's emergence as a central
force in the mobilization of the G20 Plus, 12 a bloc of developing
nations committed to global agricultural trade reform. The article
also considers Brazil's performance on the "battlefield[s] of com-
merce"13 and concludes with some thoughts regarding the constit-
7. McLaughlin, supra note 5. See also Center for International Development,
Harvard University, Brazil Summary, available at http://www.cid.harvard.educid
trade/gov/brazilgov.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2004).
8. Cf. Commentary, Cancdn Fiasco: Belling the Cat, ECON. & POL. WKLY. (Sept.
20, 2003), available at http://www.gapresearch.org/governance/RavikanthCancun3.
pdf.
9. Mac Margolis, Brazil's Growing Power, NEWSWEEK INT. (Feb. 23, 2004),
available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4402548/site/newsweek.
10. Andrew Hay, Brazil Plays for Power on World Stage, REUTERS (Oct. 19, 2004),
available at http://in.news.yahoo.com/041019/137/2he9z.html.
11. These issues are highly complex, and a complete exploration is beyond the
scope of this analysis. Furthermore, the focus of the discussion is agricultural issues.
Singapore Issues, TRIPS, etc. are not addressed in any fashion.
12. "G20 Plus" is a reference to the group of twenty nations that acted as the
catalyst for the Collapse in Canc"n. It was established in August of 2003 during the
final stages of the preparations for the V Ministerial Conference of the WTO, held in
Cancdn, Mexico, in September 2003. The group's primary focus is agriculture, the
central issue of the WTO's Doha Development Agenda. See G20, History, available at
http://www.g-20.mre.gov.br/history.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2005). While sometimes
referred to as the "G20 Plus" due to its shifting membership, nations currently
counted among the G20 Plus are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan,
Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela. See
Andrew Walker, Poor Countries Meet for Trade Talks, BBC NEWS WoRLD EDITION
(Oct. 16, 2003), at httpJ/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3196678.stm.
13. Bussey, supra note 6.
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uencies for whom Brazil ostensibly is waging this war on the
southern route to Antarctica.
II. MOBILIZATION
After being "a [rather] reluctant player14 in the Uruguay
Round,"" Brazil emerged at the WTO's Doha Round 6 as a key fig-
ure in the debate surrounding the contentious issue of agricul-
tural subsidies. Due to its historically high indebtedness and the
impact of rising interest rates, Brazil's agricultural sector suffered
severe dislocations as a result of the country's "trade liberalization
[policies] and macroeconomic adjustments." 7 Not surprisingly,
Brazil began to advocate for the liberalization of world agricul-
tural trade. For example, at the 1998 Geneva Ministerial Confer-
ence commemorating the 50th anniversary of the creation of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") (predecessor to
the WTO), 5 then-Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso
14. Brazil Centerstage at the WTO Doha Round, BRAZIL NEWS (Nov. 2001),
available at http://www.brazilinfocenter.org/pdfs/november2001.pdf.
15. The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, or the
GATT, transformed the GATT into the WTO. The negotiations were launched in
September 1986, in Punta del Este, Uruguay, and the final deal was signed by
ministers from most of the 123 participating governments at a meeting in Marrakesh,
Morocco, on April 15, 1994. See World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO:
Basics - The Uruguay Round, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/
whatise/tife/fact5_e.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2004). This Round is considered one
of the most significant multilateral trade negotiations ever undertaken. Id.
16. The Doha Round was initiated in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001, and the
negotiations under the Round got underway in early 2002. See World Trade
Organization, Negotiations, Implementation, and Development: The Doha Agenda,
available at http://www.wto.org/englishltratop e/ddae/ddae.htm (last visited Oct.
17, 2004). The Round has been labeled the "Doha Development Agenda" due to its
focus on development issues. The United States has stated that these negotiating
rounds represent "a once-in-a-generation opportunity to dramatically reform the rules
of world trade, open new markets for goods and services, and spur economic and
political progress throughout the developing world[.]" See U.S. Dept. of State, Doha
Development Agenda, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tpp/c10339.htm (last
visited Oct. 17, 2004). The 2003 WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancdin, Mexico, was
a part of the Doha Round. Optimists hope that the Round will conclude at the next
WTO Ministerial in Hong Kong, set for December 2005. Id.
17. Press Release, World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Reviews: First Press
Release, Secretariat, and Government Summaries: Brazil, available at http://www.
wto.org/english/tratop-e/tpr-e/tp45_e.htm (Oct. 24, 1996).
18. The Ministerial Conference is the WTO's highest-level decision-making body.
Members of this conference are the trade ministers of the member countries. It meets
"at least once every two years," as required by the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization - the WTO's founding charter. See World
Trade Organization, The Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, available at http://www.
wto.org/englishlthewto e/ministe/min03_e/min03_e.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2005).
The Ministerial Conference has the authority to make decisions on all matters
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stressed the need to reform the international agricultural trading
system, to which he referred as the "greatest protectionist and
subsidizing apparatus ever put together for the preservation of...
one sector."19 In 1999, Brazil traveled to the Third Ministerial
Conference in Seattle ready to cross swords on this issue, but the
"Battle of Seattle" 0 overshadowed the WTO negotiations con-
ducted during this disastrous event.
In conjunction with, and following, the Fourth WTO Ministe-
rial Conference in Doha, Qatar, in 2001, Brazil began an intensive
recruiting effort to enlist allies for its agricultural reform cam-
paign. Held only two months after the September 11, 2001, bomb-
pertaining to any of the multilateral trade agreements, and it establishes the agenda
for "rounds" of negotiations regarding trade-related issues. See, e.g., World Trade
Organization, How the Negotiations are Organized, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop-e/dda e/work.organi-e.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2005). The
negotiations take place in the Trade Negotiations Committee and its subsidiaries. Id.
The Second WTO Ministerial Conference was held in Geneva, Switzerland, on May
18-20, 1998. While the Conference was "supposedly more ceremonial than
negotiational" in honor of the GATT's 50th anniversary, see Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge
Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in Canctin and the Future
of Trade Constitution, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 219, 222 (2004), two substantive
developments did result. First, against the backdrop of the devastating crisis
amongst Asian financial markets, ministers adopted a declaration rejecting
protectionist measures. See World Trade Organization, The Geneva Ministerial
Declaration, WT/MIN(98)/DEC/1, para. 3 (adopted May 20, 1998), available at http:l
www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min98_e/mindec-e.htm (last visited Feb. 9,
2005). Second, ministers agreed upon a Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce
recognizing the growth in global electronic commerce and establishing a program to
examine all trade-related aspects of electronic commerce. See World Trade
Organization, Declaration on Global Economic Commerce, WT/MIN(98)/DEC/2
(adopted May 25, 1998), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/
min98_e/ecom_e.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2005).
19. H.E. Ambassador Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim, Market Access Developments
Since the Uruguay Round: Implications, Opportunities and Challenges, in Particular
for Developing Countries and Least Developed Countries, in the Context of
Globalization and Liberalization, Address Before the High Level Segment of the 1998
ECOSOC Substantive Session (July 7, 1998), at http://www.un.int/braziVspeech/98d-
clna-ecosoc-market.html.
20. The Battle of Seattle has entered the lexicon of civil disobedience. Bruce
Shapiro, The Seeds of Seattle, Salon.com, at http://www.salon.com/news/feature/1999/
12/08/wto/index.html (Dec. 8, 1999). See also Battle of Seattle, Salon.com, available at
http://archive.salon.com/directory/topics/battle-of seattle/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2005).
This "Battle" received extensive media coverage in late November and early
December 1999, when tens of thousands of protesters gathered in Seattle streets,
blocking the opening sessions of the WTO meeting. The world watched as police and
National Guard forces used tear gas and rubber bullets to subdue demonstrators.
Disparate interest groups mobilized with amazing speed to participate in the protest.
For example, a petition of more than 1,700 groups, mostly from developing nations,
was raised within a day to object to the way the WTO process was being conducted.
Unlikely alliances were formed, including steelworkers, union supporters,
environmental groups, and students. See Cho, supra note 18, at 222-24.
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ings of the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York
City and on the U.S. Pentagon in Washington, D.C., the Doha
Conference produced a Ministerial Declaration that committed
member countries, particularly developed countries, to phase out
export subsidies and substantially reduce trade-distorting domes-
tic support.21 However, Brazil's frustration turned to anger when
the United States enacted the 2002 U.S. Farm Bill, which intro-
duced U.S.$180 billion in farm subsidies over a ten-year period,
and when the European Union ("EU") failed to reform its Common
Agricultural Policy ("CAP").22 Brazil resolved to fight against
these measures.
And fight it did. Brazil's aggressive stance on trade reform
within the context of the FTAA during this time frame prompted
Representative Zoellick's inflammatory suggestion that the coun-
try trade with Antarctica on the southern route.23 Undeterred, the
newly elected Brazilian government, led by the PT,24 under the
leadership of the charismatic and controversial Brazilian Presi-
dent Luis In~cio Lula da Silva (more commonly referred to as
Lula), signaled its intention to take the southern Antarctic route.
In a move designed to make the Antarctic route more viable, Bra-
zil revitalized talks of a South American political bloc as a way to
wield more influence in talks with the United States on the
planned hemispheric FTAA, 25 another negotiating arena involving
agricultural issues. Lula also lead an effort to strengthen the
Southern Common Market ("MERCOSUR").2 s
21. World Trade Organization, The Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/1,
para. 13 (adopted Nov. 14, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/
minist e/min0l_e/mindecl-e.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2004) [hereinafter the 'Doha
Ministerial Declaration"].
22. See Cho, supra note 18, at 227-30.
23. See supra text accompanying note 4.
24. "PT" is the acronym for the Portuguese "Partido dos Trabalhadores," or the
Worker's Party.
25. See Andres Oppenheimer, Existence of 'Latin America' Debated in Region,
MiAMI HERALD (May 22, 2003), available at http://www.geocities.comlericsquire/arti
cles/ftaa/mh030523.htm.
26. MERCOSUR is the Spanish acronym for the Southern Common Market ("el
Mercado Comdn del Sur', a common trade market composed of Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay. See MERCOSUR, available at http://www.mercosur.org.uy
(last visited Oct. 16, 2004). In Portuguese, the acronym is MERCOSUL ("o Mercado
Comum do Sul"). See MERCOSUR, available at http://www.mercosur.org.uy/pagina
bienvenidaportugues.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2005). Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, and Peru are associate, non-voting members of the bloc. Id. At a recent
Summit, MERCOSUR welcomed Venezuela as an associate member and accepted
Mexico in principle, gaining two oil suppliers and extending the market's reach to the
U.S. border. See Ana Ines Cibilis, Venezuela Joins Mercosur, Mexico, Provisionally,
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Concurrently, Brazil formed an alliance with India and South
Africa to fight the "trade-distorting agricultural domestic support
and ... export subsidies in the advanced countries[.]"2 7 The three
nations announced the creation of the Group of Three ("G-3") to
coordinate strategies in multilateral trade talks and to deepen
their trilateral relationship.28 The group also hopes to expand to
include China and Russia.
In 2003, as the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference drew near,
Brazil and its allies fixed their attention on Cancdn. To break the
stalemate on agricultural issues, the United States and the EU
issued a joint position on the agriculture negotiations. 29 This posi-
tion was severely criticized by developing countries led by Brazil,
India, and China, who presented an alternate proposal 30 calling
for the elimination of export subsidies on all agricultural prod-
ucts. 1 Ultimately, the initial joint U.S.-EU text was withdrawn
by the Conference Chair.2
In the final weeks before the Cancdin Conference, representa-
tives of numerous developing countries met to prepare. With the
withdrawal of the U.S.-EU agricultural proposal, Brazil's emerg-
ing core group quickly gained new members when the initial dis-
senters, Brazil, India, and China, eventually persuaded other
developing countries to join their coalition. This group emerged as
the G20 Plus.33
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (July 9, 2004), available at http://www.tradeobservatory.org/
headlines.cfm?reflD=36224. Cuba also has asked to become an associate member of
MERCOSUR, a move that may further complicate Brazil's relationship with the
United States and the FTAA negotiations. Bernd Radowitz, Cuba's Bid to Join
Mercosur Could Be Latest Roadblock for Americas Free Trade Zone, ASSOCIATED
PREss (Mar. 4, 2005), available at http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/050304/brazilmercosur_
cubajl.html?printer=l.
27. India, Brazil Alliance Key to Secure Gains of Doha Agenda, WORLD TRADE REV.
(May 15, 2004), available at http://worldtradereview.com/news.asp?pType=N&iType=
A&iID=82&siD=6&nID=15042. See Andreas Hernandez, The Collapse in Cancan
and the Transformation of the Global System, Countercurrents.org (Sept. 16, 2003), at
http://www.countercurrents.org/glo-hernandez609O3.htm.
28. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, A New Opportunity in Cancdn's Failure, YALE
GLOBAL (Dec. 3, 2003), at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=2937.
29. See Cho, supra note 18, at 227-30.
30. Id.
31. Developing Countries Present Farm-Trade Plan to WTO, UN WIRE (Aug. 21,
2003), at http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20030821/449_7715.asp.
32. Rolf Kuntz, G-21 consegul nivelar campo para ojogo agricola, 0 ESTADO DE S.
PAULO (Sept. 11, 2003), available at http://www.estado.estadao.com.br; Protester Dies
at WTO Talks; Draft Agriculture Plan Withdrawn, UN WIRE (Sept. 11, 2003), at
http'//www.unwire.org/UNWire/20030911/449_8349.asp.
33. See supra text accompanying note 12.
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At the Cancdn Conference,3 Brazil took an assertive
approach to agricultural reform on behalf of the G20 Plus."
Approximately seventy other developing nations joined the G20
Plus in refusing to accept the U.S. and EU position. Developed
nations, however, were not prepared to liberalize their policies
unilaterally, rejecting demands that they open their markets
without reciprocation. The United States and others also rejected
an initiative for immediate reform of trade in cotton, an issue of
economic importance to several West and Central African
nations. 6 Facing wide substantive divergences, the WTO Confer-
ence disintegrated without consensus.
Following Canc-in, Brazil and its G20 Plus allies refuted criti-
cisms that their intransigence precipitated the collapse of the
Conference and vowed to continue to pursue the reform of the
world trading system.37 The next section will consider Brazil's
accomplishments along the southern route to Antarctica.
III. BATTLEFIELD RECORD ON THE SOUTHERN ROUTE
In the aftermath of the "Collapse in Cancfin," Brazil launched
34. The Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference was held in Cancfin, Mexico, from
September 10-14, 2003. See World Trade Organization, The Fifth WTO Ministerial
Conference, available at http://www.wto.orglenglish/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min
03_e.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2004).
35. United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Committee
on Finance, U.S. Senate, and to the Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, House
of Representatives - World Trade Organization: Cancdn Ministerial Fails to Move
Global Trade Negotiations Forward; Next Steps Uncertain (Jan. 2004), at http://www.
gao.gov/new.items/d04250.pdf.
36. Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali submitted a proposal that developed
countries eliminate their subsidies to cotton farmers and that compensation be paid
to these four countries for economic damages resulting from these subsidies. See
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Bridges Daily Update
on the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, Will Chair's AG Text Warm Up Frozen
Talks? (Sept. 12, 2003), at http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/cancun/wtodaily/ben
030912.htm. This proposal largely was directed to the United States. These
countries are highly dependent on the export of cotton, which amounts to 80% of their
export earnings. See Cho, supra note 18, at 230. However, they cannot compete in
the market with subsidized producers with allegedly artificially low-priced cotton.
Deeply frustrated with the response of the United States, which refused to eliminate
subsidies, one African cotton producer reportedly said, "We are used to hardship,
disease and famine. Now the WTO is against us as well. I think that this will stay in
history .... " Id. (citing International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development,
Bridges Daily Update on the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, At the Eleventh
Hour, Divergence All Over Again (Sept. 14, 2003), at http'J/www.ictsd.org/ministerial/
cancun/wto-daily/ben030914.htm).
37. See Cho, supra note 18, at 233-34.
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its campaign to construct a new geography of trade" across a mul-
tiple axis of attack. It began with a concerted effort to consolidate
its alliance with countries in the developing South. Within the
South American continent, MERCOSUR constituted Brazil's first
external frontier. Brazil's current objective for this allied group-
ing of countries is to complete and improve the customs union and
to deepen and expand the integration in new areas.39
MERCOSUR comprises an area of slightly less than twelve mil-
lion square kilometers, or more than four times the size of
Europe.0 It represents a potential market of 200 million people
with a joint Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") of more than U.S.$1
trillion, which places it among the four largest economies of the
world following the NAFTA, the EU, and Japan.4' Brazil's mem-
bership in MERCOSUR allows it to maximize scale advantages as
well as to increase its bargaining position in broader regional
agreements.42
Beyond MERCOSUR, Brazil sought broader economic cooper-
ation and integration between the MERCOSUR bloc and the
Andean Community.43 In 1998, the five Andean countries and the
four MERCOSUR countries signed a framework agreement for the
creation of a free trade area between the two blocs, and, in 2004,
the two groups signed a free trade pact." A common market
38. H.E. Mr. Luiz Infcio Lula da Silva, Statement by President of Brazil Luiz
Indcio Lula da Silva at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
Eleventh Session, available at http://www.un.org/webcast/unctadxi/speeches/14bra_
por2.pdf (June 14, 2004) (original Portuguese text).
39. World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the
Government - Trade Policy Review - Brazil, WT/TPR/G/75 (Sept. 27, 2000).
40. See Ministerio des RalaV6es Exteriores, Mercosur and Regional Integration,
Mercosur - The Common Market of the South, available at http://www.mre.gov.br/
ingles/politica-externa/mercosul/merco-intro.asp (last visited Feb. 11, 2005).
41. See Embassy of Brazil, London, United Kingdom, Mercosul, available at http://
www.brazil.org.uk/page.php?pid=236 (last visited Feb. 11, 2005).
42. Josefina Monteagudo & Masakazu Watanuki, Regional Trade Agreements for
MERCOSUR: The FTAA and the FTA with the European Union (Oct. 2001)
(unpublished draft paper prepared for presentation at the "Impacts of Trade
Liberalization Agreements on Latin American and the Caribbean" Conference
organized by the Inter-American Development Bank and the Centre d'Etudes
Prospectives et d'Information Internationales, Nov. 5-6, 2001, Washington, D.C.),
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/geograph/westernh/WM.pdf.
43. See Trade Policy Review - Brazil, supra note 39. The Andean Community, or
la Comunidad Andina ("CAN"), is a subregional organization made up of Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. The five Andean countries together have
120 million inhabitants living in an area of 4,700,000 square kilometers, whose GDP
in 2002 amounted to U.S.$260 billion. See Andean Community, available at http://
www.comunidadandina.orglingles/who.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
44. See Cibilis, supra note 26.
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encompassing this South American community of nations makes
the southern route to Antarctica a major thoroughfare for interna-
tional trade.
At the hemispheric level, Brazil has become a defining voice
in the negotiations regarding the creation of the FTAA."5 Brazil
strategically has used its southern route influence as a member of
MERCOSUR and its vision of an expanded South American trade
bloc to leverage its negotiating power in the debates regarding the
scope of this trade agreement. In recognition of Brazil's growing
economic and political influence, it was named a Co-Chair, with
the United States, of the FTAA negotiating process.46
The FTAA was conceived as a vehicle to unite the economies
of every country in Central America, South America, and the Car-
ibbean, except Cuba, into a single free trade area. The United
States initially envisioned the FTAA as an "ambitious project [to]
eliminate[e] trade barriers from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego,"
based upon the NAFTA model.47 A comprehensive FTAA would
open Latin American markets to a wide range of U.S. service
industries, would eliminate national restrictions pertaining to
government procurement, and would eliminate differences in
national regulatory schemes governing intellectual property or
discriminating against foreign investment and competition.' Fur-
ther, it potentially would export NAFTA's controversial investor
protection provisions, under which domestic laws of the signatory
nations may not disadvantage foreign persons or entities under-
taking business in a member nation.49
45. For a detailed history of the FTAA, visit its official website at httpJ/www.alca-
ftaa.org/alca e.asp.
46. Ambassador Rubens Antonio Barbosa, Latin American Perspective: The Free
Trade Area of the Americas and Brazil, 27 FORDHAM IN'L L.J. 1017, 1019 (2004).
47. Dr. Mario E. Carranza, MERCOSUR, the Free Trade Area of the Americas,
and the Future of U.S. Hegemony in Latin America, 27 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 1029, 1062
(2004).
48. Id. at 1032-33.
49. This is a reference to the rather infamous NAFTA Chapter 11, the discussion
of which occupies the pages of numerous scholarly journals and is beyond the scope of
this document. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., chs. 1-9, 32 I.L.M. 289, chs. 10-22, 32 I.L.M. 603 [hereinafter "NAFTA"]. For a
sample of just a few of the many law review articles devoted to the topic, see Edward
J. Sullivan & Kelly D. Connor, Making the Continent Safe for Investors - NAFTA and
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution, 36 URB.
LAw. 99 (2004); Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating
to International Law: Measures "Relating To" Foreign Investors Under NAFTA
Dispute Resolution, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 440 (2004); Daniel M. Price, An Overview of the
NAFTA Investment Chapter: Substantive Rules and Investor-State Dispute
Settlement, 27 INT'L LAw. 727 (1993).
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"Brazil, however, pressed for a slower pace in negotia-
tions[.]""0 FTAA countries, it emphasized, are vastly different in
terms of population, economic size, income levels, industrializa-
tion levels, and many other characteristics of development. Brazil
feared that its local industries would be unable to compete with
the more competitive U.S. industries51 and expressed its concerns
that the U.S. position on topics such as intellectual property, gov-
ernment procurement, services, and investment could directly
impact its regulatory autonomy and "undermine [its] capacity to
design and carry out social, environmental, and technological
development policies." 2
For Brazil, the FTAA was not, and is not, a foregone conclu-
sion. "[It will sign the agreement only if the United States makes
a serious commitment to open its domestic market[s], " l particu-
larly to agricultural imports. Brazil consistently has advocated an
FTAA that eliminates trade barriers on agricultural products,
including the elimination of domestic agricultural production sup-
port and export subsidies. Given the strong U.S. constituencies
favoring farm supports, the United States has resisted this
demand, stating its preference for the use of the WTO process to
"dismantle these barriers multilaterally. "5
When Brazil failed to capitulate to its view,55 U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative Robert Zoellick sent the now infamous harsh message
to Brazil's government. "Zoellick stated that Brazil has a choice:
50. Carranza, supra note 47, at 1043.
51. Id.
52. Barbosa, supra note 46, at 1019.
53. Carranza, supra note 47, at 1043.
54. See Jos6 Antonio Rivas-Campo & Rafael Tiago Juk Benke, FTAA Negotiations:
Short Overview, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 661, 669 (2003). While this protectionist stance on
agriculture arguably is inconsistent with its demands for trade liberalization in other
"sensitive" areas, the U.S. preference for a WTO resolution is logical. Dismantling
barriers restricting trade in agricultural goods in the context of a regional agreement
would have worldwide impact without any trade-off from countries outside the region.
Consider that Japan has a heavily subsidized agricultural sector, as does the EU,
where subsidies are nearly three times higher than U.S. levels. Id. See also Barbosa,
supra note 46, at 1020.
55. "Tempting as it is to simplify matters by reducing them to a contest between
two clearly defined camps, the current panorama is a lot more complex than that.
Countries that accompany Brazil in the G-21 (the group of developing countries whose
stance caused the Cancfin meeting to collapse) are also to be found among those that
have negotiated FTAs early on with the US: Chile, an associate member of Mercosur,
and Mexico, Washington's Nafta partner which has recently signaled its intention to
join Mercosur." Trade Blocs In Latin America: The State of Play After Cancdn, LATIN
AM. SPECIAL REP., July 1, 2004, available at 2004 WL 73258469.
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to accept the [FTAA] or to go sell their products in Antarctica."56
To emphasize its message, the United States changed its negotiat-
ing strategy and focused on making bilateral offers to countries or
groups of countries in the region instead of offering hemispheric
concessions within the FTAA platform. 7 For example, the United
States entered into negotiations on free trade agreements with
Chile and with Central American countries and the Dominican
Republic.5 It also engaged in talks with other countries in the
region, including Uruguay and the Andean Community countries
of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, as well as Panama. 9
Brazil followed these efforts closely, accusing the United
States of creating "commercial apartheid."' Brazilian officials
commented publicly that "the U.S. interest in negotiating these
bilateral agreements seems to lie primarily in their potential for
creating negotiating precedents for the future FTAA, in terms of
both 'offensive' and 'defensive' topics, and in shattering potential
coalitions with positions that are at odds with U.S. negotiating
ambitions."" During this period, Brazil continued to rally its
Antarctic route allies in MERCOSUR and the ANDEAN pact
countries, managing successfully to block the U.S. plan to isolate
it in FTAA talks.2 It also issued its own subtle threats to the
56. McLaughlin, supra note 5.
57. Carranza, supra note 47, at 1057-58.
58. The United States signed the Central America Free Trade Agreement
("CAFTA") with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua on
May 28, 2004. See Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative,
United States and Central America Sign Historic Free Trade Agreement (May
28, 2004), at http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/Press-Releases/2004/May/
United-States-Central-America-Sign-Historic-Free-Trade-Agreement.html. The
Dominican Republic joined the CAFTA in August of 2004. See Press Release, Office of
the United States Trade Representative, Dominican Republic Joins Five Central
American Countries in Historic FTA with U.S. (May 28, 2004), at httpJ/www.ustr.gov/
DocumentLibrary/PressReleases/2004/August/DominicanRepublicJoinsFive_
CentralAmericanCountriesinHistoricFTAwith_U.S.html.
59. See Rivas-Campo & Benke, supra note 54, at 679. See also Christina R.
Sevilla, Can the United States and Brazil Spur Free Trade in the Americas - Cancan
Versus Miami, IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST (Jan. 7, 2004), available at http://www.in
thenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol3Issue1Vol3lssuelSevillaPFV.html.
60. Tim Padgett (Miami) & Andrew Downie (Brasilia), Lula's Next Big Fight, TiME
ONLINE EDITION (Nov. 16, 2003), available at http://www.time.com/time/nationlarticle
0,8599,543734,00.html.
61. Barbosa, supra note 46, at 1024.
62. U.S. attempts to disarm Brazil in FTAA talks have been hindered by its
failure to support Argentina during the severe economic crisis of 2001-2002. This
failure created incentives for Argentina to strengthen its strategic alliance with
Brazil and the rest of Latin America and seriously damaged U.S. credibility in the
region. Carranza, supra note 47, at 1034, 1047, 1048. Dr. Carranza presents a
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United States, aggressively pursuing a free trade agreement with
the EU.6 3
In an effort to break the impasse regarding the United States'
"maximalist" approach to the FTAA, Brazil put forward a "Brazil-
ian Proposal" for a "feasible" FTAA.1 This general concept has
prevailed in recent discussions, resulting in what has been
referred to as the "FTAA Lite." This new framework is docu-
mented in the so-called Miami Declaration,6 5 a set of principles
which "contemplates a more flexible, but also diluted, FTAA."6
Pursuant to the Miami Declaration, the FTAA parties will
attempt to develop a common set of rights and obligations applica-
ble to all FTAA members, with optional provisions that allow
countries to assume different levels of commitment in any one of
the areas of negotiation. Should they choose, members may reject
the NAFTA-style trade disciplines or may participate at more
ambitious levels in terms of the commitments they make and the
benefits they receive on a bilateral or plurilateral basis. This
compromise is perceived as a diplomatic victory for Brazil in its
compelling discussion of the failure of the "Washington Consensus" in Latin America
and the resulting political fall-out in the region. Id.
63. This is an effective strategy, given the "furious EU-U.S. competition" for
emerging markets in Latin America and Asia. Carranza, supra note 47, at 1035.
Further, courting other trading partners such as the EU would reduce Brazil's
dependence on the United States and provide it and its MERCOSUR partners with a
meaningful alternative to the FTAA. Id. at 1043. However, the Brazil-EU courtship
has not been a particularly smooth one. In October 2004, MERCOSUR and the EU
failed to conclude their negotiations on a free trade agreement. After Failure of
Lisbon, Continuation of Free-Trade Negotiations Postponed until 2005, AGENCE
EUROPE (Oct. 22, 2004), available at 2004 WL 85167317. Not surprisingly, the
negotiations floundered over MERCOSUR's call for improved access to European
markets for agricultural products and for services. The EU, also not surprisingly,
demanded greater market openness for industrial products and services. Id. For a
discussion of Brazil's plan to create an "auction dynamic" between the United States
and the EU, see Christopher M. Bruner, Hemispheric Integration and the Politics of
Regionalism: The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 1, 34-38 (2002).
64. Barbosa, supra note 46, at 1021.
65. Free Trade Area of the Americas, Eighth Trade Ministerial Meeting,
Declaration of Ministers, Miami, Florida (adopted Nov. 20, 2003), available at http:l!
www.ftaa-alca.orgfMinisterials/Miami/Miami-e.asp (last visited March 17, 2005).
66. Carranza, supra note 47, at 1054.
67. Id. In the vocabulary of the WTO, "plurilateral" agreements contrast with
multilateral agreements in that plurilateral agreements are signed only by member
countries that choose to do so, while all members are party to multilateral
agreements. See Caribbean Policy Development Centre, Glossary of Trade Terms
(2002), available at http:164.233.161.104/search?q=cache:LNUUNOBRsEJ:cpdcngo.
org/cpdc/docs/Shantal%2520documents/Glossary%2520of% 252OTrade%2520%2520
Terms.doc+plurilateral+multilateral+definition&hl=en.
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campaign to achieve a greater degree of balance and symmetry
between the rights and commitments of developed and developing
countries in matters of trade."
Brazil's crusade to construct a new world trade geography
also extends across the global South. Post-Cancdin, Brazil has
focused this avenue of attack on strengthening its trilateral rela-
tionship with the other two members of the G-3, India and South
Africa. 9 These industrial democracies represent the core of the
G20 Plus, and trade between the three has been increasing rap-
idly. 0 For example, in 2002, Brazilian exports to India were
larger in percentage terms than its exports to any other country;
"[tihe total bilateral trade in 2002 reached U.S.$1.2 billion."7'
While this sum represents only about "one percent of Brazil's total
foreign trade flow," trade with India "is growing rapidly, more
than doubling in the past three years."72
Trilaterally, the G-3 countries can reinforce their individual
economic strength. Amongst these three nations, there is a mar-
ket of 1.2 billion people, U.S.$1.2 trillion of GDP, and foreign
trade of U.S.$300 billion. Trade officials plan to increase trilateral
trade flows from U.S.$4.6 billion presently to U.S.$10 billion by
2007. 7' Additionally, following Brazil's lead, MERCOSUR also is
68. In the FTAA negotiations, Brazil has emphasized "the challenge of promoting
integration among a large number of countries with a sharp degree of economic
disparities and different levels of ambition vis-A-vis the scope of the future FTAA. In
fact, no other trade integration process has ever been launched on the basis of such a
heterogeneous set of countries as the FTAA negotiations." Barbosa, supra note 46, at
1019-20.
69. See Rajagopal, supra note 28.
70. Along with their closer economic ties, the G-3 democracies are attempting to
influence global politics as well. Id. For example, they have agreed to work together
to reform the United Nations, particularly urging the expansion of the U.N. Security
Council to reflect the realities of the international community. Sridhar
Krishnaswami, India, Brazil, South Africa Call for U.N. Revamp, THE HINDu (Sept.
25, 2004), available at http://www.hindu.com/2004/09/25/stories/2004092501621200.
htm. This is a public declaration of support for Brazil's bid to gain a permanent seat
on the Security Council. In January 2004, Brazil took a two-year place on the Council
and is lobbying strongly for the seat to become permanent. Elise Labott, Powell Calls
Brazil 'Serious Candidate' for U.N. Security Council, CNN WORLD (Oct. 5, 2004), at
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/americas/10/05/powell.brazil/.
71. Embassy of Brazil in India, Brazil-Indian: Dynamic Trade Relations,
available at http://brazilembassyinindia.com/btrade.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2005).
72. Mario Osava, Global Policy Forum, India-Brazil: Cementing the South-South
Alliance, INTER PRESS SERv. NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 31, 2004), available at http://www.
globalpolicy.orgglobaliz/econ2004/013lindiabrazil.htm.
73. International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, India, Brazil,
South Africa Strengthen South-South Cooperation, BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS
DIGEST (Mar. 10, 2004), available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/04-03-10/story3.htm.
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concluding preferential trade agreements with South Africa and
India.74 A marked success for Brazil, this G-3 collaboration inau-
gurates a new era in South-South cooperation and allows the
developing South to wield significantly more influence in interna-
tional trade negotiations.
If Brazil's battle plan succeeds, China, and possibly even Rus-
sia, will join the G-3 alliance along the Antarctic trade route.
After the failure of the WTO talks in Cancim, Brazil has been
actively seeking to recruit China to join the struggle to redraw the
map of world trade geography. In recent bilateral discussions
with China,75 Brazil sought to intensify the two nations' bur-
geoning trade relationship, an important relationship considering
that the two countries are the developing world's two biggest econ-
omies."6 "Total trade between the two nations grew five-fold
between 2000 and 2003 to a value of [U.S.]$8 [billion]."7 v In 2004,
trade between Brazil and China may surpass U.S.$8 billion.78
During these bilateral discussions, Brazil invited China to
join the emerging trade alliances between developing countries.
For example, Brazil announced plans to establish a free trade pact
between China and MERCOSUR, creating a "healthy multipo-
larity" in trade that would strengthen the developing world's cam-
paign to eliminate agricultural subsidies in rich nations.79
74. See Rajagopal, supra note 28.
75. Brazil's efforts to improve its relationship with China may pay political
dividends as well as economic rewards. China has expressed its sympathy for Brazil's
aspirations to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. China
would be an important sponsor considering that it holds one of the five permanent
seats on the Council. "China views the question with sympathy, supports Brazil's
desire to play a bigger role in the United Nations, and we can discuss this matter
further," said the Chinese Ambassador to Brazil. Edla Lula, Lula's Great China Trip,
Bazzi (May 2004), at http://www.brazzil.com/2004/html/articles/mayO4/pl4lmayO4.
htm.
76. Brazil Wins China Trade Support, BBC NEWS WORLD EDITION (May 28, 2004),
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3756635.stm.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. Brazil and its MERCOSUR allies also have been discussing an enhanced
trade relationship with the Gulf Cooperation Council. See Mercosur Approaches Arab
Countries, MERCOPRESS (Feb. 24, 2005), at http://www.mercopress.com/Detalle.asp?
NUM=5167&Palabra=gulf. The Council includes Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United
Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar. While visiting the chairman of the
Council in Saudi Arabia to discuss a possible cooperation framework agreement
between MERCOSUR and the Council, Brazilian Foreign Secretary Celso Amorim
also planned to visit Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait,
Tunisia, and Algiers. Id. During this trip, Brazil scheduled a Summit of South
American and Arab Countries, which will be held in Brazil in May 2005. According to
Eduardo Duhalde, the head of MERCOSUR's representative commission, the purpose
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Further, Brazil has made no secret that it hopes that China and
Russia will join the G-3 along the Antarctic route to counterbal-
ance what it perceives as the U.S. and European dominance of
global trade.8"
Meanwhile, despite its successful battles at the sub-regional,
regional, and supraregional levels, Brazil did not abandon its
trade reform offensive within the WTO multilateral trading sys-
tem.8 To the contrary, the WTO may be the forum in which Bra-
zil has achieved its most significant Antarctic route victories.
Flexing its new "trade broker" muscles, Brazil broke ground in
2002 by initiating the WTO's dispute settlement procedure
against U.S. domestic support measures for cotton producers,
exporters, and users.82 This was the very first WTO challenge
involving agricultural farm subsidies, and the mere fact of its fil-
ing was a seminal event.
In its complaint, Brazil alleged that subsidies paid to U.S. cot-
ton farmers from 1999 to 2002, and those subsidies mandated
of this Summit is "to conquer markets without 'scandalous subsidies in farming
products'-as is the case in the US and the EU. . . ." Mercosur, Arab Presidential
Summit to Take Place in May, MERCOPRESS (Mar. 32, 2005), available at http://www.
mercopress.comlDetalle.asp?NUM=5373. Some observers have expressed concerns
about a draft Declaration pertaining to the Summit which contains statements that
"strongly condemn Israel and tacitly endorse violent Arab groups that are on the U.S.
State Department's list of terrorist organizations." Andres Oppenheimer, Arab
Summit Draft Raises Concerns, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 6, 2005), available at http:fl
www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/columnists/andresoppenheimer/10576246.
htm. Countries scheduled to participate in the Summit include Argentina, Algeria,
Bahrain, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Ecuador, Guiana, Iraq,
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, the Palestinian
Authority, Paraguay, Peru, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian
Arab Rep., Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yemen. See
Summit of South American-Arab Countries, at http:/www2.mre.gov.br/aspa/en-home
2.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2005). This is particularly noteworthy considering that
Israel is another potential MERCOSUR trading partner. An Israeli official recently
declared Israel's desire to reactivate trade agreement talks with MERCOSUR. Israel
Wishes to Reactivate FTA Talks with MERCOSUR, CHINA VIEW (Mar. 8, 2005),
available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-03/08/content_2667025.htm.
80. Brazil Wins China Trade Support, supra note 76.
81. See Trade Policy Review - Brazil, supra note 39. While this article focuses on
agricultural matters, it should be noted that Brazil also joined seven other WTO
members in lodging a complaint against U.S. tariffs on steel imports. The resulting
ruling authorized the imposition of retaliatory restrictions on trade with the United
States, convincing the United States to drop the steel duties. World Trade
Organization Appellate Body, United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248/AB/R (Nov. 10, 2003).
82. WTO Upland Cotton Panel Report, supra note 1. Cotton producers from the
West African nations of Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Senegal joined Brazil's
challenge. Id.
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through 2007 in the latest Farm Bill, violated the "Peace Clause"
in the WTO's Agreement on Agriculture. 3 Under the terms of the
Peace Clause, countries enjoyed immunity only if they capped
their subsidies at the 1992 levels. In 1992, the United States
allegedly paid cotton producers U.S.$1.62 billion. Brazil con-
tended that the United States breached that cap in 1999 and
2001, paying its cotton farmers U.S.$2.3 billion in 1999 and
U.S.$2.06 billion in 2001. "Brazil argue[d] that these subsidies
distort[ed] trade by depressing world cotton prices" and that, "[a]s
a result, Brazilian cotton producers . . . lost out on sales worth
U.S.$600 million in the 2001-02 season alone." 4 Meanwhile, the
U.S. share of world cotton exports rose from under 20% in 1999 to
more than 40% in 2004.11 Brazil argued that, were it not for these
distorting subsidies, U.S. cotton output would have fallen by 29%
between 1999 and 2002, and world prices would have risen by
12.6%.6
The United States countered that its farm payments do not
distort trade as they are "decoupled" from production. Instead,
farmers are paid according to the number of acres that they
planted and to the cotton they produced in the past, regardless of
their current production. Accordingly, these subsidies do not arti-
ficially inflate supply or depress prices. 7
In its September 8, 2004, report, the WTO panel hearing Bra-
zil's challenge ruled in favor of Brazil on all of its major claims.88
83. The Peace Clause, aptly named as it was designed to prevent a trade war, is
the commonly used referent for Article 13 of the Agriculture Agreement. This Clause
precludes most dispute settlement actions against a country that is complying with
the Agriculture Agreement's domestic and export subsidy commitments. See World
Trade Organization Agreement on Agriculture, art. XIII, Apr. 1994, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal e/14-ag.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2005)
[hereinafter "Agreement on Agriculture"] (the Agreement on Agriculture is one of the
agreements signed at the Marrakesh Ministerial Meeting in April 1994, and was
among those agreements included in the Final Act resulting from the 1986-1994
Uruguay Rounds).
84. The West African nations suffered even more disproportionately. They are
heavily dependent on cotton for the bulk of their export earnings. They were hit
particularly hard by sharp falls in cotton prices in recent years. As one article
remarked, "West Africa's case against cotton subsidies was moral; Brazil's is legal."
Unpicking Cotton Subsidies, THE ECONOMIST GLOBAL AGENDA (Apr. 30, 2004),
available at http://www.economist.com/agenda/PrinterFriendly.cfm?StoryID=26269
00.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See WTO Upland Cotton Panel Report, supra note 1.
88. Id. The Panel did, however, agree with the United States that the income
support provided to U.S. cotton farmers that is fully decoupled from production and
prices has not suppressed or depressed world cotton prices. Id. It also rejected
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The Panel concluded that, because subsidies exceeded 1992 levels,
the U.S. cotton program violated international trade rules. 9 Not
unexpectedly, the United States appealed the ruling,s0 but this did
little to dampen Brazil's enthusiastic response to the win: "'This
is a precedent,' said Roberto Azevedo, a legal adviser to Brazil's
foreign ministry. 'This is a war that must continue.' 91
The EU also has suffered casualties on the WTO front in Bra-
zil's continuing trade reform war. In 2003, Brazil, with Australia
and Thailand, filed a complaint in the WTO against EU sugar
subsidies.92 The complaint alleged that the almost U.S.$2 billion
in annual export subsidies that the EU pays its sugar farmers
encourages overproduction and artificially depresses international
prices.93 Brazil accused the EU of exporting more subsidized
sugar than is allowed under WTO trade agreements. The com-
plaint estimated that global sugar prices would rise almost 20% if
Brussels scrapped subsidies and that Brazilian sugar producers
Brazil's claim that U.S. domestic support programs caused an increase in U.S. world
market share for upland cotton, and it declined to find that U.S. domestic support
programs threatened to cause, or per se caused, serious prejudice to Brazil's interests
from 2003-2007. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Emad Mekay, U.S. Appeals WTO Ruling On Cotton Subsidies (Correction),
INTER PRESS SERV. NEWS AGENCY (Oct. 20, 2004), available at 2004 WL 59285674.
The appeal was unsuccessful. WTO Rejects U.S. Appeal in Cotton Case, REUTERS
(Mar. 3, 2005), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7079004/print/1/
displaymode/1098/.
91. Unpicking Cotton Subsidies, supra note 84. See also US Loses WTO Cotton
Subsidy Case, supra note 3. One interesting development to monitor as Brazil
amasses victories in its trade crusade: groups of U.S. investors are purchasing and
operating farms in Brazil. Brazil Iowa Farms, L.L.C., is one such group, with about
250 investors, most of whom hail from Iowa. This group purchased a 7,000 acre farm
in central Brazil and is negotiating for another large parcel. Plans are to raise cotton,
soybeans, and corn. Jerry Perkins, Farmland Lures Investors to Brazil, DES MOINES
REG., May 2, 2004, at 1M. Other similar groups seek investors for Brazilian
agricultural investments. Id.
92. Report of the Panel, European Communities - Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/
DS266/R (Oct. 15, 2004), available at http'/www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wto
panels/ec-sugar(panel)(brazil).pdf [hereinafter "WTO Sugar Panel Report"].
Commentators have found the situation somewhat ironic given that the EU already
had planned a "'radical overhaul' of its sugar program [that] would 'substantially cut
back EU sugar exports and export refunds, abolish intervention, reduce EU
production and the internal sugar price.'" WTO Rules U.S. Cotton Subsidies & EU
Sugar Subsidies are Illegal - WTO Rules Against EU Sugar U.S. Cotton Support,
Backing Brazil, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 8, 2004), at http://www.organicconsumers.orgcorp/
sugar091004.cfm.
93. See Todd Benson, Brazil's New WTO Success Could Spur More Cases, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 6, 2004), available at http:/www.kniff.de/cgi-bin/cgiproxy/nph-proxy.cgi/
01011OA/http/www.iht.com/articles/532844.htm.
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lost U.S.$500 million to U.S.$700 million in exports per year
because of these subsidies.
Brussels disputed that charge, insisting that Europe's sales of
sugar bought from poor countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and
the Pacific basin should not be counted against its permitted
exports. The EU accepts 1.6 million tons of sugar imports under
poverty alleviation programs benefiting African, Caribbean, and
Pacific nations, and some of these imports are re-exported. A
spokesman said that the EU was one of the world's largest import-
ers of sugar and hence a major supporter of farmers in poor coun-
tries. "'If [Brazilians] are attacking the EU, they are attacking
developing countries,' said Gregor Kreuzhuber, the European
Commission's agriculture spokesman."94
The EU also pointed to inconsistencies between the complain-
ants' claims and the structure of their own past and present sugar
regimes, and it warned that the complaint threatened not only EU
sugar producers, but also producers in the poor African, Carib-
bean, and Pacific countries that enjoyed preferential access
arrangements with the EU.95
Siding with Brazil, the WTO Panel ruled that as much as half
of EU sugar exports exceeded subsidy ceilings." The Panel found
that EU sugar support distorts world market prices because sur-
plus production enjoying production subsidies must be exported.97
The EU Commission unsuccessfully appealed the ruling,98 Brazil
celebrated yet another victory, proclaiming it to be an important
step in the elimination of distortions in agricultural markets.
These battlefield successes have provided heavy ammunition
for Brazil in its global trade reform war. The landmark WTO
Panel Reports resulting from Brazil's WTO litigation strategy
may prompt a flurry of similar claims from other developing coun-
tries. Trade observers reportedly have warned that Brazil's wins
will open "'the floodgates for challenges' against developed coun-
try agricultural subsidies," particularly given the expiry of the
94. See WTO Sugar Panel Report, supra note 92. See also Bitterness at EU Sugar
Subsidies, BBC NEWS WORLD EDITION (Apr. 27, 2004), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
business/2285293.stm.
95. European Union News Release, EU Commission Appeals WTO Sugar Ruling,
at http://www.eurunion.org/News/press/2004/200400142.htm (Oct. 15, 2004).
96. WTO Sugar Panel Report, supra note 92.
97. Id.
98. EU Loses Sugar Appeal, Spurring Policy Overhaul, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 28,
2005), available at http://bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=71000001&refer=australia#.
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Peace Clause.99
This litigation threat compounds the potential impact of the
Panel Reports on Brazil's Doha Round negotiating strategy. Bra-
zil recognized this conflation within the WTO front, stating that it
"'didn't bring these cases to interfere with the WTO negotiations,
but without them,' the EU and U.S. 'would never change their pol-
icies,' . . . 'The cases are an important element for pressure."'100
In July 2004, Brazil pressed its advantage in the Doha Round
battle when it succeeded in forging a new framework agreement
on agriculture. 10 1 Pursuant to this agreement, members will elim-
inate their agricultural export subsidies and will review export
credit and export guarantee programs to ensure that they are not
trade distorting.10 2 Accordingly, cotton export subsidies will now
be formally negotiated as part of the Doha Round.
The framework also calls for deep cuts in tariffs that provide a
barrier to the importation of agricultural products.1 3 Countries
with the highest tariffs will be called upon to make the deepest
cuts in an attempt to harmonize tariff levels across all countries.
Trade-distorting forms of domestic support for agriculture will be
cut substantially, with caps on support levels on specific commodi-
ties and cuts in the overall levels of trade-distorting supports."°
In the first year of implementation, each member's total trade-dis-
torting support will be cut by 20% from currently allowed levels. 0 5
Brazil celebrated the new framework as yet another conquest
99. International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Bridges Weekly
Trade News Digest, WTO Interim Report on US Cotton Case: Brazil Claims Victory
(Apr. 28, 2004), available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/04-04-28/storyl.htm. Trade
analysts predict that this ruling also makes other agricultural products, such as
soybeans and rice, vulnerable to similar challenges. Sandy Burke & Sam Goble,
COHA Research Assocs., Brazil Continues to Emerge, But Has Not Quite Arrived, at
http://semana2.terra.com.co/imagesSemana/documentos/brasil-coha-20040824.doc
(Aug. 18, 2004).
100. WTO Rules U.S. Cotton Subsidies & EU Sugar Subsidies are Illegal - WTO
Rules Against EU Sugar U.S. Cotton Support, Backing Brazil, supra note 92.
101. Doha Work Programme, Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August
2004, WT/L/579 (Aug. 2, 2004).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. Aside from this deadline, the framework's agricultural annex lacks
concrete commitments and lacks details on dates for the phasing out of export
subsidies and on the criteria for the designation of special agricultural products. For
a collection of opinions criticizing the July Framework, see Anup Shah, WTO July
2004 Package of Framework Agreements (Aug. 2, 2004), at http://www.globalissues.
org/TradeRelated/FreeTrade/July2004Package.asp.
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in its campaign to reform the world's agricultural markets. 16 The
newly assertive Brazil is not only protecting, but is also
expanding, its borders in the new geography of trade. While its
battlefield successes along the Antarctic route appear to justify its
aggressive tactics, the following section considers whether Brazil
has had to make sacrifices in "its heady new role as Third World
standard bearer."0
7
IV. CONSTITUENTS AND CASUALTIES
Brazil's southern route victories have been credited with revo-
lutionizing the dynamics of global trade negotiations. Yet critics
suggest that casualties litter the route to Antarctica in Brazil's
wake. Challenging both its methods and its motives, these critics
question whether Brazil has the moral authority... to act as the
leading advocate for the interests of the developing world.
With regard to its methods, "Brazil is gaining a reputation as
a spoiler" among much of the developed world.0 9 After the col-
lapse of the WTO talks in Cancdn, U.S. Trade Representative
Robert Zoellick publicly castigated Brazil and its allies, stating
that "[tihe rhetoric of the 'won't do' overwhelmed the concerted
efforts of the 'can do[.]' 'Won't do' led to impasse."110 U.S. Senator
Chuck Grassley, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee at
the time, similarly opined: "'[Some participants [in trade talks]
seem[ I to be more satisfied with hollow rhetoric than real negotia-
tion."'' Seasoned trade observers have suggested that Brazil's
"intransigent" negotiating stance has perpetuated the polarized
atmosphere in the WTO, preventing, rather than promoting, pro-
gress in multilateral negotiations.112
Brazil's motives for assuming the mantle of spokesperson for
the developing world on agricultural trade issues, or of its General
in this trade war, also have been questioned by developed coun-
106. Mario Osava, Brazil Deals Another Blow to Farm Subsidies, INTER PRESS
SERV. NEWS AGENCY (Aug. 4, 2004), available at http://www.ipsnews.net/interna.asp?
idnews=24945.
107. Padgett & Downie, supra note 60.
108. See, e.g., Hay, supra note 10.
109. Brazil Summary, supra note 7.
110. See Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Trade
Talks Collapse Over Unwillingness of Some to Negotiate, USTR Says, available at
http://mumbai.usconsulate.gov/wwwhwashnews787.html (Sept. 14, 2003).
111. See Cho, supra note 18, at 233 (citing Memorandum from the Office of U.S.
Senator Chuck Grassley, Collapse of Trade Negotiations in Cancfin (Sept. 14, 2003)).
112. Brazil Summary, supra note 7.
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tries. 113 "U.S. Trade Representative Zoellick [has] lashed out at
advanced developing countries such as . .. Brazil . . . stressing
that 'large emerging market countries [who are] . .. competitive
... should not expect more lenient terms... which should be the
reserve of the poorest developing countries. 'So that's how we're
going to have to strike the balance,' he said - 'for those that are
truly in need versus those that are competitive. ' '1 4
Cynics also allege hypocrisy in Brazil's aggressive condemna-
tion of U.S. cotton subsidies. The chairman of the U.S. National
Cotton Council noted that "'it is interesting that while Brazil is
alleging serious prejudice in the WTO, it is expected to increase
cotton production in 2004 by 85 percent over its 2001 production.
While U.S. production [is declining], Brazil and China are
expected to increase production .. , [and] the combined market
share of Brazil and China is expected to climb by six percentage
points to 34.5 percent in 2004 as compared to 2001."'ll This
increase, the chairman noted, is almost twice the size of the entire
annual cotton crop in West Africa, countries from which region
joined Brazil in its WTO cotton complaint against the United
States and which are unlikely to be able to compete against the
more competitive Brazilian cotton exports." 6 In his view, "'[t]he
rhetoric blaming the United States for oversupply and overpro-
duction of cotton are simply and clearly inaccurate.'""7 Even Bra-
zil's cotton farmers acknowledge that the country "'is certainly
one of the most competitive cotton-producing areas in the
world.""' 8 They brag that the Brazilian State of Mato Grosso is
"drawing farmers from all over [Brazil] in search of cheap land
and low labor costs.""' 9
Brazil's WTO cotton and sugar complaints raise another con-
cern regarding Brazil's methods. Although Brazil asserts that it
"'didn't bring these cases to interfere with the WTO negotia-
tions,'" critics charge that Brazil's litigation strategy weakens the
113. Cf. Forrest Laws, NCC Chairman Says Brazil's WTO Economic Analysis
Faulty, SOUTHWEST FARM PRESS (July 7, 2004), available at http://southwestfarm
press.com/news/070704anderson-speechl.
114. India, Brazil, South Africa Strengthen South-South Cooperation, supra note
73.
115. Laws, supra note 113.
116. Cf. id.
117. Id.
118. Todd Benson, Brazil's Big Stake in Cotton Likely to Become Bigger, N.Y. TIMES
(June 29, 2004), available at http://www.globalexchange.org/countries/brazil/2205.
html.
119. Id.
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multilateral trade system. 12° Not only does litigation divert
resources from the negotiating process, countries may stall negoti-
ations if they perceive that they will be forced to "pay twice" on an
issue.12' Litigation also is very public and can be fiercely acrimoni-
ous, souring relationships and strengthening a nation's resolve on
an issue. What Brazil gains in litigation it may lose economically
or politically.
Even some of Brazil's southern route allies privately have
become skeptical that Brazil has the credentials to represent a
developing world constituency. Brazil is the largest economy in
Latin America and the eighth largest in the world. 22 Agriculture
accounts for 27% of Brazil's GDP,'23 and the country is among the
top five largest exporters of coffee, orange juice, cane sugar, beef,
poultry, corn, soybeans, and soybean meal in the world. 124
Brazil also is a member of the Cairns Group, a coalition of
seventeen agricultural exporting countries which acounts for one-
third of the world's agricultural exports. 25 These "efficient agri-
cultural producers" seek to further liberalize agricultural by
"advocating for improved agricultural market access across the
board."126
This position, however, is not unanimous among Brazil's
allies in the G20 Plus.'27 Members with less competitive agricul-
tural sectors see unfettered liberalization as a threat "and are
demanding greater flexibility in the administration of [agricul-
tural] support programs."128 Various groups of developing coun-
tries have advocated for the inclusion of strategic products and a
special safeguard mechanism in the agriculture negotiations;
120. Cf WTO Rules U.S. Cotton Subsidies & EU Sugar Subsidies are Illegal - WTO
Rules Against EU Sugar U.S. Cotton Support, Backing Brazil, supra note 92.
121. Tim Josling, Agricultural Trade Cases in the WTO: What Do They Mean for the
Agricultural Negotiations?, IPC Roundtable Discussion, available at http://www.agri
trade.orgBrown%20Bag%20Series/josling.ppt (last visited Nov. 1, 2004).
122. Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, Agri-Food Trade Policy, available at http:ll
www.agr.gc.ca/itpd-dpci/english/country/brazil-e.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2004).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Cairns Group members include Australia, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand,
Paraguay, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay. For more
information about the Cairns Group, visit its website at http://www.cairnsgroup.org/
introduction.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2004).
126. Guy de Jonquieres, Fresh Road Map to Help Find the Exit, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 1,
2004, at 4, available at 2005 WL 9303336; Brazil Summary, supra note 7.
127. Brazil Summary, supra note 7.
128. Id.
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others seek to preserve current preferential treatment. 12 9 Poorer
countries that enjoy preferential access to rich nations' markets
justifiably fear the intense competition that liberalization could
bring.'30 In FTAA talks, for example, the "U.S. offer[ed to] grant[ I]
different rates of reductions in trade barriers throughout the
region, providing .. . [greater] access to the U.S. market for the
smaller and poorer economies [as compared to access for]
MERCOSUR [members]."31 Instead of supporting this position,
Brazil argued that MERCOSUR was unfairly penalized by this
approach.1 32 Some of these smaller and poorer countries might
admit to feeling abandoned by Brazil on the Antarctic route.
Internal conflicts also exist within MERCOSUR, Brazil's
power base. Brazil's cotton boom has caused friction with neigh-
boring Argentina, where textile manufacturers complain that they
are being flooded with "cheap," or inexpensive, cloth made from
Brazilian cotton. 3 3 G-3 members too disagree on agricultural poli-
cies. India, for instance, still hopes to protect domestic agricul-
tural industries, while fellow G-3 ally Brazil is pushing "to further
liberalize trade in this area.' 34 While it is naive to assume that
the so-called Third World will always speak with a unified voice,
some poor developing countries feel betrayed and exploited by
Brazil's position on agricultural trade issues.135
Consider also the contention that Brazil, which has the
eighth-largest economy in the world but ranks fourth worst in the
gap between rich and poor, cannot act as a moral leader of the
developing world.1 3' Although Brazil is the eleventh wealthiest
country on the planet, nearly 70% of Brazilians live in poverty,
with 40% living on less than U.S.$1 per day.'3 ' Ten million Brazil-
ian citizens are chronically undernourished,138 while "most of the
[nation's] wealth is concentrated in a [very] few hands or leaves
129. Cho, supra note 18, at 236-37.
130. de Jonquieres, supra note 126.
131. Carranza, supra note 47, at 1051.
132. Id.
133. Benson, supra note 118.
134. Cho, supra note 18, at 236.
135. Cf. Briefing Paper, Arrested Development? WTO July Framework Agreement
Leaves Much To Be Done, OXFAM INT. (Aug. 2004), available at http://www.oxfam.
org.uk/what-we-do/issues/trade/bnwtoframework.htm.*
136. Hay, supra note 10; Marc Cooper & Tim Frasca, Lula's Moment, THE NATION
(Mar. 10, 2003), available at http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20030310&s=
frasca.
137. Hernandez, supra note 27.
138. Cooper & Frasca, supra note 136.
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the country through multinational corporations."139
Brazil's President Lula was elected on promises to redress
these social inequities. 4 0 Lula's election victory was viewed as a
product of "'the people's mobilization,"''4 uniting peasants, the
urban poor, workers, the middle class, and factions of the elite
behind a plan to revive the economy by enacting massive land
reform, by expanding domestic demand, and by stimulating
national industries."4 On international trade, Lula stated:
"Through our foreign trade ... Brazil's foreign relations will aim
at improving the living conditions of Brazilian men and women, at
increasing income levels and generating dignified jobs. Trade
negotiations are today of vital importance." However, "Brazil's
leaders have yet to explain fully to Brazil's 180 million people how
its rising global political influence will fix its 11% illiteracy rate,
widespread poverty, crumbling roads, and stifling bureaucracy."44
Critics charge that these dismal social conditions, combined
with the country's sophisticated and efficient sectoral production,
sustain Brazil's agricultural strength.' 45 Much of Brazil's agricul-
tural production is dominated by foreign capital. 46 For example,
Cargill Incorporated, the international marketer, processor, and
distributor of agricultural, food, financial, and industrial products
and services, is the fifth largest exporter of Brazilian coffee, han-
dles 20% of the country's soybean exports, processes 25% of its
coca, is the third largest orange juice producer in the country, and
is its second largest seed company. 14 The powerful agribusiness
also owns a significant volume of export terminal capacity in
Brazil.141
139. Hernandez, supra note 27.
140. Cristovam Buarque, Brazil Lula's Empty Promises, BRAZZIL (Sept. 2004),
available at http://www.brazzil.com/2004/html/articles/sepO4plO6sepO4.htm.
141. Brazil's Lula Caught Between the Nation and Free Trade, EXEC. INTELLIGENCE
REV. (Nov. 8, 2002), available at http://www.larouchepub.com/other/2002/29431ula-
braz.html.
142. Walden Bello, Brazil's New Era, FRONTLINE (Nov. 2002), at http://www.front
lineonnet.com/fll923/stories/20021122000405800.htm.
143. President Luiz Incio Lula da Silva, A New Course for Brazil, Address to the
Congress by the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, at http://www.mre.
gov.br/ingles/politica externa/discursos/index.asp (Jan. 1, 2003).
144. Hay, supra note 10.
145. Cancdn: Another World Fights to be Born, A WORLD TO WIN NEWS SERV. (Oct.
12, 2003), at http://rwor.org/a/1215/awtwcancun.htm.
146. Id.
147. Amit Thorat, Rising Market Control of Transnational Agribusiness, IDEAs
(Dec. 1, 2003), available at http://www.networkideas.orgfocus/dec2003/fo01_Market_
Controll.htm.
148. Id.
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This foreign capital has provided Brazil with some of the
world's most modern agricultural facilities. However, laborers
from the poorest regions in the country make these facilities
work.'49 They are paid very low wages and are treated differently
than are wageworkers in more developed countries.5 0 These con-
ditions, activists contend, make it possible for Brazil to be a major
agricultural exporter.'5 ' Lula was elected to the presidency in
2002 promising massive land reform to ease these inequalities, yet
these promises also appear to be casualties of his deliberate march
to Antarctica.'52
For example, it was not without irony that the architect of
Brazil's WTO litigation strategy is a wealthy Brazilian agribusi-
nessman, 153 Agriculture Minister Roberto Rodrigues. Minister
Rodrigues is credited with convincing a reluctant Brazilian
Administration to take on the United States and the EU in the
WTO.54 Rodrigues, who comes from a prominent Sao Paulo farm-
149. Cancdn: Another World Fights to be Born, supra note 145. For a discussion of
these monopsony conditions in Latin America, see Jonathan B. Wight, Does Free
Trade Cause Hunger? Hidden Implications of the FTAA, 2 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus.
167, 173-75 (2001).
150. Cancun: Another World Fights to be Born, supra note 145.
151. Id.
152. Natuza Nery & Andrew Hay, The Farmer Behind Brazil's Big Farm Fight
REUTERS (Sept. 20, 2004), available at http://www.truthabouttrade.orgarticle.asp?id=
2544. See also ANGUS WRIGHT & WENDY WOLFORD, To INHERIT THE EARTH: THE
LANDLESS MOVEMENT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR A NEW BRAZIL (2003). This book tells
the story of Brazil's Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem-Terra (the MST, or, in
English, the Landless Workers Movement), which has been called "the most
important and exciting popular movement in the world." Noam Chomsky,
Confronting the Empire, ZNET (Feb. 1, 2003), at http://www.zmag.org/content/
showarticle.cfm?SectionID=40&ItemID=2938. This group has secured rights to more
than 20 million acres of unused farmland for millions of desperately poor, landless,
jobless, and seemingly helpless men and women.
153. See Nery & Hay, supra note 152.
154. Pedro de Camargo Neto, who was Brazil's deputy agriculture minister at the
time, also is recognized as advocating Brazil's WTO litigation strategy. In 2001, he
began a campaign to sue the United States when he heard repeated complaints from
soybean farmers about lower-priced American soybeans. A wealthy cattle rancher
from the state of Sdo Paulo in the middle of Brazil's farm belt with a master's degree
in engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Mr. Camargo is not
one of the dispossessed." He had been an adviser for Brazil during global trade
negotiations in the Uruguay Round, and he remains involved in Brazil's legal actions,
advising the private sector on the agricultural trade talks and acting as a consultant
to Brazil's Commodities and Futures Exchange. Elizabeth Becker & Todd Benson,
Brazil's Road to Victory Over U.S. Cotton, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2004), available at
http://thereitis.org/displayarticle251.html. It is also enlightening that Brazilian
cotton farmers raised the money to fund the WTO cotton litigation. They organized a
cash-generating raffle of cattle, agricultural equipment, and cars to collect the money
needed to begin the historic legal action against the United States. See Carlos
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ing family, strongly disagreed with Lula on the President's plans
to focus on family farming rather than agribusiness. Rodrigues'55
argued that, instead of devoting resources to land reform that
would offer small plots to thousands of peasants, Brazil would be
better served by fighting to remove domestic and international
barriers to large-scale farmers, who already were "the world's top
coffee, sugar and orange juice producers, the biggest beef export-
ers, and who were set to become the [number one] soy
exporters."'56
Lula was convinced, and now Brazil's agribusiness exports
are driving Brazil's fastest economic growth since 1996.111 At
home, Rodrigues' defense of agribusiness "may have dampened
[Lula's] enthusiasm for agrarian reform and whet his appetite for
trade battles.""8 "[Big farmers have never had it so good,"'59 and
Brazil's first leftist, working-class president is better known for
challenging First World nations over agricultural trade issues on
the Antarctic route than for land reform efforts designed to assist
Brazil's poor.
Lula's original leftist coalition of the Landless Workers Move-
ment ("MST"), 160 labor unions, and some members of his Partista
Trabalhador ("Worker's Party") have taken note of this stark dis-
parity. While Brazil has become one of the largest food exporters
in the world, nearly a third of the Brazilian population suffers
food insecurity. 161 Lula has a strong constituency, but it is a differ-
ent one than that upon which he originally based his presidential
platform. "[T]he left is now adrift"'62 and accuses the President of
Castilho, Brazen Brazil Picks Away at Agricultural Subsidies, THE WORLD PAPER
(May 2004), available at http://www.worldpaper.com/2004/may/mayl.html.
155. Some claim that Rodrigues will stop at nothing to promote farming interests.
The Pastoral Land Commission, a Catholic human rights group, accuses Rodrigues of
destroying family farming. Some environmentalists also contend that he is doing too
little to protect Brazil's vast savanna from agricultural encroachment. "He seems not
to consider the savanna as an important ecosystem," said an environmental activist in
Brazil who has met with Rodrigues in an effort to save some of the 30% of the tropical
wilderness that remains. See Nery & Hay, supra note 152.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. "MST" is the Portuguese acronym for "Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais
Sem-Terra," or the Landless Workers Movement. See WRIGHT & WOLFORD, supra
note 152.
161. Norman Madarasz, Dissecting Brazil's Zero Hunger, BRAZZIL (Sept. 2003),
available at http://www.brazzil.com/2003/html/news/articles/sepO3/plO4sepO3.htm
(quoting Brazilian Minister of Food Safety, Jos6 Graziano da Silva).
162. Burke & Goble, supra note 99.
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ignoring his election pledges for social reform.16 3 While Brazil's
international influence grows, domestic unrest threatens public
support for government policies. Compromise on issues such as
budget spending and fiscal policy have delayed the ambitious Zero
Hunger"8 and land reform programs upon which Lula cam-
paigned. After such little progress, many of Brazil's landless and
poverty stricken are disillusioned by Brazil's aggressive march
along the southern route.
6 5
V. CONCLUSION
When U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick warned Bra-
zil that it could "take the southern route to Antarctica" to sell its
products,' he likely did not anticipate Brazil's emergence as a
powerful voice in regional and global trade negotiations. Brazil
accepted this challenge and declared war on the status quo of the
world's dominant trading system. Heading firmly down the
Antarctic route, Brazil skillfully enlisted allies and carefully con-
structed campaign strategies in its trade reform crusade. Despite
its numerous critics, Brazil has persevered, and its stunning bat-
tlefield victories have been influential in creating a new geogra-
phy of global agricultural trade.
163. Buarque, supra note 140.
164. When Lula was sworn in on January 1, 2003, he promised to focus his
administration's attention on ending hunger in Brazil, appointing a new Minister for
Food Safety to co-ordinate a "Zero Hunger (or Fome Zero, in Portuguese) Programme."
President Lula stressed that "if, by the end of my mandate, every Brazilian has food
to eat three times a day, I shall have fulfilled my mission in life." Embassy of Brazil,
London, United Kingdom, Zero Hunger Programme, available at httpJ/www.brazil.
org.uk/page.php?cid=1501 (last visited Nov. 2, 2004).
165. Nery & Hay, supra note 152. The MST also is angry that Lula abruptly
reversed course and overturned the ban on planting genetically modified soybeans. In
March 2005, Brazil's Congress passed a Biosafety Law that permits the planting of
genetically-modified crops ("GMOs"). "Brazilian President Luiz Indcio Lula da Silva
defied his environment minister, much of his party and his own campaign promises
this week when he won legislation to allow the sale and planting of GMO plants[.] ...
Big farmers driving economic growth and biotechnology firms like Monsanto Co.
supplying the seeds were seen as gaining from the controversial legislation... 'Brazil
is just building up agribusiness[,]' said Gabriela Couto of Greenpeace's campaign
against GMO crops." Andrew Hay, Environmentalists Fear Brazil's Lifting of GMO
Ban, REuTERS (March 4, 2005), available at http://www.reuters.co.uk/newsArticle.
jhtml?type=worldNews&storyD=684076&section=news&src=rss/uk/worldNews.
The MST and small Brazilian farmers believe that the move will bring them no
benefit and will serve to further advantage multinationals such as Cargill and
Monsanto, who will be able to collect large fees from the farmers every year for their
use of the genetically engineered seeds. Cancdn: Another World Fights to be Born,
supra note 145.
166. McLaughlin, supra note 5.
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Brazil's central challenge now is to strike a balance between
taking a defiant and unyielding stance in pursuit of its interests
and those of its southern route allies and jettisoning the firm ideo-
logical stance on which it has pursued its trade reform agenda 167
Should it pugnaciously adopt a "won't do" negotiating position,168
the United States and other developed countries most certainly
will attempt to paint Brazil as a reckless international populist.169
Conversely, should it appear too conciliatory, it risks alienating
the many supporters who have come to rely on Brazil as a power-
ful spokesman for their interests. 170
Brazil also risks alienating its citizenry if it ignores pressing
commitments at home while pursuing its aggressive Antarctic
route campaign. To date, Brazilian President Lula has main-
tained domestic support by "'talking left, governing right[,]""7'
and the very fact of his election is symbolically compelling. 172 One
might question, however, whether his administration can con-
tinue to balance its ambitious domestic social reform agenda with
its aspirations to alter the balance of power in the global system of
trade.
Based upon its successful campaign thus far along the south-
ern route, Brazil seems up to these challenges. As Lula has
stated: "'The U.S. thinks first and foremost about the U.S., so now
it's up to the Brazilians to think more about ourselves,' he told
Time last year. 'Foreign trade and relations depend on daring,
wisdom and political will.""73 And, regardless of its ultimate win/
loss record, Brazil's agricultural trade war 74 has made the
Antarctic route a prominent landmark in the new geography of
world trade. 75
167. Brazil Summary, supra note 7.
168. See supra text accompanying note 110.
169. Padgett & Downie, supra note 60.
170. Brazil Summary, supra note 7.
171. Summit of Americas Center, Florida International University, State of
Democracy in the Americas Conference Series, Brazil More Aggressive, But Outlook
for Better Results Under Lula Still Cloudy Experts Conclude (Mar. 4, 2004), at http:ll
www.americasnet.net/news/brazil-conflreport.pdf.
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174. Brazil Summary, supra note 7.
175. See H.E. Mr. Luiz Indcio Lula da Silva, supra note 38.
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